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Great War, Civil War, and Recovery:  
Russia’s National Income, 1913 to 1928 
 
ANDREI MARKEVICH AND MARK HARRISON 
 
The last remaining gap in the national accounts of Russia and the USSR in  
the twentieth century, 1913 to 1928, includes the Great War, the Civil War,  
and postwar recovery. Filling this gap, we find that the Russian economy did 
somewhat better in the Great War than was previously thought; in the Civil War 
it did correspondingly worse; war losses persisted into peacetime, and were  
not fully restored under the New Economic Policy. We compare this experience 
across regions and over time. The Great War and Civil War produced the 
deepest economic trauma of Russia’s troubled twentieth century. 
 
he last remaining gap in the twentieth-century national accounts of 
Russia and its successor state, the Soviet Union, runs from 1913 to 
1928. This gap is crowded with momentous events including Russia’s 
Great War (1914 to 1917), the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Civil 
War (1918 to 1921), and the years of postwar recovery that turned out 
to be the prelude to Stalin’s revolution from above.  
 These events raise many questions. How effectively did alternative 
government policies and economic systems mobilize the economy in 
time of war? After seven years of international and civil conflict, how 
great and how persistent were the damage and losses? Did the mixed 
economy of the 1920s provide an effective framework for sustained 
recovery? Did Stalin’s five-year plans take a fully recovered economy 
as their starting point, or was there still a backlog of unexploited 
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potential? All of these questions are made more difficult to answer by 
the lack of continuous and consistent national income data. 
 In this article, we provide new estimates of the real national income 
of Russia and the Soviet Union for the missing years and we apply them 
to these questions. In addition, the missing years have significance 
beyond Russia. The horrors of war and civil war in Russia were not 
unique. By filling the gap, we also aim to place Russia more precisely 
in the spectrum of national experiences of conflict in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. 
 We are not the first to labor in this vineyard. Scholars and 
government agencies inside and outside Russia have provided important 
studies of sectoral activity and economic aggregates in particular 
subperiods and on varying definitions.1 These are our starting points, 
but they also present a range of difficulties including incomplete 
coverage of time and space, and conceptual inconsistency with national 
income measures of earlier and later periods and other countries. As we 
discuss below, nearly all estimates of Soviet output follow, intentionally 
or by default, a material-product concept that excludes final services. 
Some estimates take into account only industry and agriculture, while 
others suffer from significant statistical biases. 
 Paul Gregory’s estimates of real GDP in 1913 and 1928 on Soviet 
territory from nominal outlays and expenditure deflators are the most 
authoritative and consistent of previous studies.2 He did not fill in the 
gap of the intervening years, but he built a glass bridge across them. 
As Table 1 shows, Gregory found that in 1928 real national income 
exceeded its 1913 level (within the same borders) by at most 6.5 
percent. Because the population on that territory had increased by about 
10 percent, average incomes must have declined. 
 We go beyond Gregory by filling in all the years of this turbulent 
period. Our estimates are independent of his, being based on production 
rather than expenditure. We go beyond others by applying the 
framework of the UN System of National Accounts.3 In this framework, 
GDP is supposed to cover the production of goods and services for 
final demand. Previous estimates of national income and surveys of 
aggregate trends over our period (other than Gregory’s) have generally 
 
 
1 We summarize and review previous work in this field by scholars and government agencies 
inside and outside Russia in the unpublished Appendix and Tables A1 to A6, available at 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/publications/abstract.htm?id=2. Henceforth, for references to the 
Appendix and Tables, refer to this online document. Poletaev, “Ekonomicheskie krizisy,” has 
helpfully collated many of the Russian estimates.  
2 Gregory, Russian National Income and “National Income.” 
3 UN, System. 
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TABLE 1 
GREGORY'S POPULATION AND NATIONAL INCOME: RUSSIA AND USSR,  
1913 AND 1928 
 
Russian Empire 
excl. Finland 
Soviet Union, 
Interwar Borders  
 Best 
Estimate 
Upper 
Limit 
Population, million  
1913 171 139.7 
   
1928 — 154              154 
Percent of 1913 —    110.2 110.2 
 
NNP, million rubles at 1913 prices  
1913 20,266                            16,520 
   
1928 —           15,600         17,600 
Percent of 1913 — 94.4 106.5 
   
NNP/head, rubles   
1913 118.5 118.3 
   
1928 — 101.3 114.3 
Percent of 1913 — 85.7 96.6 
Sources: Russia and Soviet Union, best estimate: Gregory, Russian National Income, p. 113. 
Soviet Union, upper limit: Gregory, “National Income,” p. 337. As may be judged from Table 2, 
the 1913 population figure of 171 million is that for the empire within 1913 borders, including 
Poland but not Finland. 
 
counted only material production and transport, to the neglect of services.4 
This is bad for measurement over the long run, because it would drop 
much economic growth of Europe and North America out of the picture.5 
But it can be equally harmful in the short run, for example in the case of a 
war boom, when the role of military services increases abruptly. 
 Robert Higgs has argued that defense should be omitted from wartime 
GDP, not because defense is a service, but because defense is not a final 
service. It is an intermediate use of resources, he suggests, or a cost of 
maintaining society.6 In this view, only civilian goods and services 
contribute to social welfare. On a consumer welfare standard, a war boom 
is not a real boom, just a time when everyone has to run faster to stand 
still—if they are lucky. 
 
4 This was the case for all estimates by Russian scholars. In quantitative surveys and 
estimates, western scholars have considered only agriculture, industry, and transport (Nutter, 
“Effects”; Gatrell and Harrison, “Russian and Soviet Economy”; and Gatrell, “First World War” 
and “Poor Russia”). 
5 See Broadberry, Market Services. 
6 Higgs, Depression, pp. 65–68. 
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 This argument has some merit. We do not fully adopt it for two 
reasons. First, as Abram Bergson argued, GDP as conventionally 
measured does at least represent an observation of society’s productive 
possibilities, or the potential to deliver social welfare under alternative 
conditions—for example, the absence of war.7 Second, there is virtue in 
conforming to a measure of national income that is internationally 
recognized and comparable with measures of other periods and other 
countries. For these reasons, we follow convention to produce orthodox 
measures of national income. At the same time, we will offer parallel 
measures that make explicit some of the consumption and welfare 
implications of warfare. 
 
TERRITORY AND POPULATION 
 
 In 1917 the Russian Empire disintegrated. The Soviet Union was 
formed in 1922 from the empire’s rubble, without Finland, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and parts of the Ukraine and Belorussia.  
The Central Asian territories of Khiva and Bukhara were formally 
incorporated in 1925.8 Table 2 lists the effects of these changes on the 
territory and population of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. 
The net effect on territory was small; the land surface under Moscow’s 
dominion in the 1920s was still 97 percent of that under St. Petersburg 
in 1913. In contrast, the effect on population was dramatic because  
the areas lost were densely settled: by 1922 one-fifth of the official 
residents of the empire of 1913 had escaped from Moscow’s control. 
 The profusion of border changes raises the question of what national 
entity and associated territory we should take for our 1913 baseline. We 
can start with the Russian Empire, excluding Poland and Finland. We 
can follow what happened on this territory through 1917, but no further. 
Hence we prefer to take the territory of the Soviet state within the 
frontiers of 1925 to 1939 (“interwar borders”) as our main benchmark. 
What happened on this territory can be tracked back to 1913, by 
deducting the western regions from the empire. 
 As shown in Table 2, the population of the Russian empire 
(excluding Poland and Finland) in 1913 was officially some 159 
million; based on the same official figures, the number of people living 
on the territory of the future Soviet state in the same year, was 138 
million. These figures require correction. The only census of the 
imperial population was held in 1897. Over the years that followed, in 
 
 
7 Bergson, Real National Income, pp. 26–41. 
8 Carr, Socialism, pp. 288–89. 
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TABLE 2 
FROM RUSSIA TO THE USSR: TERRITORIES AND POPULATIONS OF JANUARY 1, 1913 
 
Area in  
Square Km 
Official 
Population 
Less 
Double 
Counting 
Corrected 
Population 
 
 
 (all data in thousands)
Russian Empire in 1913 borders 21,800 174,100 — — 
Less Finland    –326   –3,197 — — 
Empire excl. Finland 21,474 170,903 –9,195 161,708 
Less Poland    –113 –11,961 — — 
Empire exc. Finland and Poland 21,361 158,942 –8,551 150,391 
Other territory lost*     
Western    –375 –20,047 — — 
Caucasus      –22      –475 — — 
USSR in 1922 borders 20,964 138,420 — — 
Territory gained**     
Central Asia      278     2,259 — — 
USSR in 1925 borders 21,242 140,679 –7,447 133,232 
Notes: * West: The provinces of Bessarabia, Vilno, Vitebsk (33 percent), Volyn (50 percent), 
Grodno, Kovno, Kurliand, Lifliand, Minsk (33 percent), Podolsk, Pskov (10 percent), Kholm, 
Estliand, and insigificant parts of Arkhangel and Petrograd. Caucasus: the provinces of Kars, 
Batumi (50 percent), and insignificant parts of Erivan. 
** Central Asia: Khiva and Bukhara. 
Sources: Area: Figures in square versts given by Anfimov and Korelin, Rossiia, pp. 11–15, 
converted at 1.0668 km per verst. Population: as Appendix Tables A7 and A8. 
 
the rural localities of European Russia, the authorities correctly 
registered births and deaths but failed to count the out-migration of 
peasants to cities or to Siberia. At the same time, these newcomers were 
counted at their new places of residence. As a result, they appeared 
twice in the demographic statistics. This double counting continued 
for two decades; thus official figures increasingly overstate the 
real population in each successive year. Working forward from the 
1897 census on the basis of births, deaths, and net migration in each 
year, Roza Sifman proposed to subtract 5.38 percent from the 1914 
population, and we follow her lead.9 
 Table 2 shows the corrected population of the Russian Empire at the 
beginning of 1913 (excluding Poland and Finland) as 150 million. 
Correspondingly, about 133 million people lived on the future Soviet 
territory in the same year. By 1928 the Soviet population had grown 
to 152 million—a relatively safe figure, based on the first Soviet census 
of 1926. Between 1913 and 1926 three demographic catastrophes 
overlapped: the Great War, the Civil War, and a postwar famine. 
Apportioning deaths among them is a hazardous and unfinished 
 
9 Sifman, “Dinamika.” 
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business.10 We divide the period into 1913 to 1918 and 1920 to 1928. In 
the first period, we start from a corrected 1914 population figure. For 
1913 and 1915 to 1918 we apply annual birth and death rates together 
with estimates of war losses and net migration, forced and voluntary, 
from various sources. From the first USSR population census (1926) 
back to the closing stage of the Civil War (1920), we rely on a widely 
accepted reconstruction carried out at the end of the Soviet era. That 
leaves 1919, for which we average 1918 and 1920.
 Table 3 presents the results of our reconstruction. Series for Soviet 
interwar territory and the Russian Empire both show an increase in the 
population during the first years of the Great War. After 1915 trends 
diverge. On the empire territory, population then fell continuously until 
the data come to an end. The main factors were a jump in mortality and
a smaller drop in fertility. On Soviet territory, in contrast, the population 
continued to grow until 1918. Indeed, the interior regions of the empire 
that would later form the Soviet Union received waves of refugees 
from the war-torn and soon-to-be-independent western territories. Until 
1917 the influx onto Soviet territory more than offset the indigenous 
population’s decline. From the start of the Civil War, however, the Soviet 
population fell for several years because of high death rates associated 
with combat, infectious diseases, and famine. At the same time, the 
earlier inward migration was partly reversed as some wartime refugees 
left Soviet territory and returned home, and some indigenous inhabitants 
emigrated. Only after 1923 did population growth resume at the rate of 
2.5 million per year on average.  
 Over the turbulent decade from the first day of 1914 to the last of 
1923, the population on Soviet territory grew by a small amount. We 
account for the components of this increase in Table 4.11 The most vivid 
number in this table is the 13 million “excess” deaths attributed to civil 
and military conflict. Excess deaths are not the exact number that were 
killed or died prematurely as a direct result of the Great War and Civil 
War, for this number is not knowable. Rather, it is the least number that 
must have been killed or died prematurely because of warfare, given the 
peacetime probability that some would have died anyway. Our figure 
falls midway between the 12 million proposed in 1948 by A. Ia. Boiarskii 
and the 13.8 million found more recently by Sergei Maksudov.12  
 Notably, only one in eight of these premature deaths took place on the 
battlefields of the Great War. The rest arose from famine, disease, and 
 
 
10 For a review, see Vyshnevskii, Demograficheskaia modernizatsiia. 
11 For full details, see the Appendix and Table A9. 
12 Boiarskii, “K voprosu”; and Maksudov, Poteri naseleniia. 
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TABLE 3  
POPULATION OF RUSSIA AND THE USSR, 1913 TO 1929 
  
Corrected for Double Counting, 
Border Changes and Migration 
 
Territory Under 
Government 
Control 
   
Official 
Figures 
Jan. 1 
  
  
 Jan. 1 Apr. 1 July 1  Jan. 1 July 1 
 (A)   (B) (C) (D)  (E) (F) 
(in thousands) 
Russian Empire excl. Finland and Poland  
1913 158,942  150,391 — 152,259  150,391 152,259 
1914 162,890  154,127 — 155,188  154,127 155,188 
1915 166,658  156,249 — 156,050  156,249 150,620 
1916 169,290  155,851 — 155,329  144,991 144,469 
1917 —  154,807 — 154,432  143,948 143,573 
1918 —  154,057 — —  — —
Soviet interwar territory     
1913 —  133,232 134,015 134,798 
 
— — 
1914 —  136,363 137,073 137,783 — — 
1915 —  139,203 139,787 140,371 — — 
1916 —  141,539 142,087 142,634 — — 
1917 —  143,729 143,943 144,157 — — 
1918 —  144,585 144,146 143,707 — — 
1919 —  142,829 142,390 141,950 — — 
1920 —  141,072 140,070 139,068 — — 
1921 —  139,068 138,722 138,376 — — 
1922 —  137,684 137,720 137,756 — — 
1923 —  137,827 138,419 139,012 — — 
1924 —  140,196 140,938 141,680 — — 
1925 —  143,163 143,818 144,472 — — 
1926 —  145,781 146,500 147,219 — — 
1927 —  148,656 149,398 150,139 — — 
1928 —  151,622 152,388 153,155 — — 
1929 —  154,687 — — — — 
Note: In this and following tables, numbers that are interpolated or extrapolated are shown in 
italics. 
Sources: A and B: Figures for 1913 to 1918, official and after adjustment, are from Appendix 
Tables A7, column H, and A8, columns H and K. Figures for 1920 to 1928 are from Andreev, 
Darskii, and Khar'kova, Naseleniia, p. 119, using their high-mortality series for 1920 through 
1922. For discussion and our own corrections, see the Appendix. C and D: The July 1 figure, 
which we use for the calendar year average, is found as the average of the January 1 figures for 
the current and following years. The April 1 figure, used for the economic year (October to 
September) average, is the average of the January and July figures for the current year. E and F: 
Figures are adjusted for territory held by the imperial government. 
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TABLE 4 
POPULATION CHANGES: SOVIET INTERWAR TERRITORY, JAN. 1, 1914 TO DEC. 31, 1923 
(in thousands) 
1. Net increase            3,834 
2. Births, total          52,156 
3. Deaths, total         –49,994 
Of which,  
4. Normal deaths        –36,958 
5. Excess deaths (row 3, less 4)        –13,037 
Of which,  
6. Military deaths, 1914 to 1917          –1,626 
7. Other excess deaths (row 5, less 6)        –11,411 
8. Net migration 1,672 
Source: Appendix Table A9. For discussion of our estimation procedure, see the Appendix. Net 
migration is calculated as the residual. 
 
military actions of the Civil War period. Despite excess mortality on this 
terrifying scale, the total population increased. The main factor was high 
fertility, but the collapse of the empire also contributed in the form of net 
immigration.  
 
REAL NATIONAL INCOME 
 
 Scholars have had to take care with volume indices since Alexander 
Gerschenkron identified the gap that arises between alternative measures
when price and quantity changes are negatively correlated.13 We calculate 
the real national income of Russia and the Soviet Union in 1913 rubles. 
In 1913 Russia had a relatively free and open market economy; it 
participated extensively in world trade, with market prices responding to 
supply and demand. Thus, valuing 1928 national income at 1913 prices is 
meaningful. By contrast, 1913 national income valued at the prices of 
1928 is not. By 1928 the Soviet economy had been cut off from the world 
by a state monopoly of foreign trade. Domestic prices were intentionally 
distorted by controls and subsidies.14 This is why we do not revalue 
national income in the prices of 1928. 
 In Table 5, we estimate the real national income of the Russian Empire 
and the Soviet Union by sector of origin. We start from net value added 
in 1913 by branch on the territories of the Russian Empire (excluding 
Finland) and the USSR within interwar borders.15 We use these to weight
  
 
13 Gerschenkron, Dollar Index. 
14 Harrison, “Peasantry,” pp. 113, 288; and Allen, Farm to Factory, p. 83. 
15 In 1913 there was a bumper harvest of food grains. Some have thus proposed that the prewar 
benchmark should combine the nonagricultural production of 1913 with farm output averaged over 
1909 to 1913 (Wheatcroft, Davies, and Cooper, “Soviet Industrialization”; Davies, “Introduction”; 
and Harrison, “National Income,” p. 333, footnote 10). But in fact, total output in 1913 is predicted 
by the log-linear trend of average real incomes from 1885 to 1912 within 0.5 percent. For full details, 
see the note to Appendix Table A-39. 
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TABLE 5 
NET NATIONAL INCOME OF RUSSIA AND USSR: MILLION RUBLES AT 1913 
MARKET PRICES AND PERCENT 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Construction Transport
Other  
Civilian
Military 
Services Total 
Percent  
of 1913 
Large-
Scale 
Small-
Scale 
Russian Empire excl. Finland and Poland 
1913 8,288 2,793 1,212 956    972 4,263    243 18,727 100.0 
1914 7,643 2,969 1,188 971 1,033 4,138    410 18,352 98.0 
1915 7,795 3,099    950 714 1,243 4,137 1,095 19,034 101.6 
1916 6,709 2,631 1,069 557 1,329 3,686 1,553 17,535 93.6 
1917 6,575 2,046    950 400    776 3,222 1,362 15,331 81.9 
1918 5,128    876    891 137 — — — — — 
1919 4,464    463    594 104 — — — — — 
Russian Empire (excl. Finland and Poland) under government control 
1913 8,288 2,793 1,212 956    972 4,263    243 18,727 100.0 
1914 7,643 2,969 1,188 971 1,033 4,138    410 18,352 98.0 
1915 7,301 3,099    950 714 1,243 3,989 1,095 18,392 98.2 
1916 6,198 2,631 1,069 557 1,329 3,533 1,553 16,870 90.1 
1917 6,054 2,046    950 400    776 3,065 1,362 14,653 78.2 
Soviet interwar territory 
1913 7,292 2,408    981 878    833 3,835    213 16,439 100.0 
1914 6,710 2,560    962 891    859 3,708    360 16,050 97.6 
1915 6,931 2,671    769 655 1,088 3,750    961 16,825 102.3 
1916 5,723 2,268    866 512 1,198 3,270 1,363 15,199 92.5 
1917 5,838 1,764    769 367    658 2,908 1,196 13,500 82.1 
1918 4,464    755    721 126    175 1,932      62   8,236 50.1 
1919 3,878    399    481 96    222 1,571    372   7,019 42.7 
1920 3,653    421    433 62    145 1,459    724   6,897 42.0 
1921 3,282    384    481 60    178 1,357    535   6,277 38.2 
1922 3,927    533    529 113    229 1,650    273   7,254 44.1 
1922/23 4,527    746    577 178    298 1,958    121   8,406 51.1 
1923/24 5,891    973    702 242    396 2,539      97 10,839 65.9 
1924/25 7,236 1,509    813 401    521 3,243      97 13,819 84.1 
1925/26 7,613 2,152    894 614    728 3,715      97 15,812 96.2 
1926/27 7,756 2,442    981 744    824 3,945      97 16,788 102.1 
1927/28 8,079 2,852    981 881    887 4,234      97 18,010 109.6 
Sources: For 1913 the starting point for national income and value added by sector of origin on 
both Russian and Soviet territory is Appendix Table A10, but the empire territory here includes 
Poland, which we deduct from national income as a whole in proportion to its population (Table 2) 
multiplied by the relative income coefficient of 1.0852. We assume that Poland was at least as 
wealthy, relative to the rest of the empire, as all western provinces were, relative to the provinces at 
formed the Soviet Union. Comparing the two territories shown in Table A10, it is easily found that, 
in the western provinces of the empire in 1913, average incomes were 132.3 rubles, compared 
with 122.0 rubles on Soviet territory. Thus, average incomes of the western provinces exceeded 
those on Soviet territory by a factor of 1.0852. Value added by other civilian sectors (forestry, 
fishing and hunting, communications, trade, and other civilian services) in 1913 is found as the 
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TABLE 5 — continued
residual after value added by agriculture, large and small industry, construction, transport, and 
military services is deducted from national income. Figures for subsequent years are then 
interpolated on aggregate index numbers or other series tabulated in the Appendix as follows: 
agriculture, Table A11 (total); large-scale industry, Table A13 (total); small-scale industry, 
Table A14 (column D); construction, Table A16 (total); transport, Table A17 (rail and 
waterways, total); and military services, Table A20 (column D). An exception is the 1927/28 
figure for small industry, missing from the source; we assume that, in the deteriorating 
conditions of the late 1920s, small industry ceased to grow. For years after 1913, other civilian 
sectors are interpolated on the sum of agriculture, large and small industry, construction, and 
transport. 
  
annual series of production by branch, rolling national income of the 
two territories forward in parallel, year on year to 1917.16 In each year of 
the overlap, the transition from Russian to Soviet territory is found by 
subtracting activity on the lost territories (agriculture and transport); or by 
interpolating the trend in one territory on the trend in the other (industry, 
construction, and other civilian sectors); or by assuming a common trend 
and scaling from one territory to the other on the basis of relative 
populations (military services). 
 Underlying these calculations is a large body of production data 
that were collected contemporaneously and published then or soon after, 
including nine agricultural products, sixty industrial products, and a 
variety of measures of activity in other sectors.17 The quality of the data 
is U-shaped over time; all years of the Civil War are poorly documented, 
but 1918 (the first year of the new order) is the worst. Large-scale 
industry and rail and river transport were observed more fully than 
agriculture and small industry; we have no usable data on civilian 
services and road transport. Data on agriculture and small industry suffer 
from a range of known biases and omissions. Livestock and field crops 
are known to have been undercounted under the old regime by varying 
amounts. In the 1920s the downward bias in crop measurement became a 
political issue; scholars and specialists risked their liberties and lives 
 
 
 
16 Underlying national income shares are taken from Appendix Table A10. There is a discrepancy of 
territorial coverage for the Russian Empire up to 1917. Annual time series of wartime production of the 
Russian Empire by sector of origin are based on the empire territory, excluding Finland and Poland. We 
weight them by national income shares based on the territory excluding Finland only. Ideally, we would 
deduct the contributions of the Polish provinces of the Russian Empire from these shares. The Polish 
provinces, with other western provinces of the future independent states, formed the economically most 
developed region of the Russian Empire, but the exact sectoral composition of Poland’s national income in 
1913 is unknown. Correction for this would leave our estimates effectively unchanged. As a cross-check, 
we applied Soviet-territory production branch weights estimated for 1913 to the Russian Empire 
production series. Annual pairs differed by not more than 0.15 percent in any year. 
17 Appendix Tables A11 to A20 provide branch-level data and describe sources and methods, 
while Tables A21 to A36 report commodity-level data for agriculture and industry. 
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FIGURE 1 
RUSSIAN AND SOVIET REAL NATIONAL INCOME, 1913 TO 1928: NEW AND OLD 
ESTIMATES, PERCENT OF 1913 
 
Source: Tables 1 and 5 and Appendix Tables A3, A5, and A39. 
 
when they took the wrong side.18 In our Appendix, we give further detail 
and explain the corrections that we apply. 
 Table 5 shows that, within given borders, Russia’s national income 
fell below 1913 by nearly one-fifth in 1917, and more than three-fifths 
by 1921. Based on Table 5, Figure 1 compares our aggregate figures 
for national income with previous estimates for comparable years, setting
both Russia and USSR to 100 percent in the base year (1913 or 
thereabouts). Compared with Peter Gatrell’s, our view of the Great War 
is more positive; the main reason for this is that our national income 
includes the contribution of military services. Our view of 1923 falls 
far below B. A. Gukhman’s, based on his attempt to deflate nominal 
output to constant prices at a time of hyperinflation. Most notably, our 
observation of 1928, with national income above 1913 by just under 10 
percent, closely matches that of Gregory. Our national income concept is 
the same, while our sources and methods are entirely independent. Thus, 
our study and Gregory’s cross-validate each other.  
 
18 On understatement of the prewar grain harvest and the complex factors behind it see 
Wheatcroft, “Agriculture,” and Wheatcroft and Davies, “Agriculture.” Gukhman, Produktsiia 
(1e), cited by Wheatcroft and Davies, “Agriculture,” p. 288, identified the prewar underrecording 
of potatoes, and Vainshtein, Narodnoe bogatstvo, did the same for livestock herds. 
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FIGURE 2 
REAL NATIONAL INCOME PRODUCED IN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE ON 
SOVIET INTERWAR TERRITORY, 1913 TO 1928: NEW AND OLD ESTIMATES, 
PERCENT OF 1913 
Source: Table 5 and Appendix Tables A1 and A4. 
 
 Some previous estimates have provided relatively complete series for 
industry and agriculture combined, and Figure 2 compares these with 
our estimates for industry and agriculture alone. From 1916 onwards our 
series track the lower edge of the envelope; this shows that we are 
relatively pessimistic about the main production sectors in the Civil War.
The reason is to be found not in different original sources, but in 
the correction factors that we apply to the low-quality wartime data—
particularly to grains. 
 Table 6 compares output with population to find income per capita. 
While aggregate real output was almost 10 percent greater in 1928 than 
in 1913, average incomes did not fully recover. The reason is that the 
population increased by about 14 percent within the same boundaries. 
As a result, Soviet national income per head in 1928 fell short of the 
prewar benchmark by around 3 percent. 
 Figure 3 contrasts the trend of national income (“goods and 
services”) per head with two other measures of the average level of 
existence of Russian and Soviet citizens. “Goods and nonmilitary 
services” aims to capture the availability of resources for civilian use. In 
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TABLE 6 
NET NATIONAL INCOME OF RUSSIA AND USSR PER HEAD: RUBLES AT 1913 
MARKET PRICES AND PERCENT 
 Rubles Percent of 1913 
 
Goods 
and 
Services 
 
(A) 
Goods 
and 
Nonmilitary
Services 
 
(B) 
Goods 
from 
Agriculture 
 
(C) 
 
Goods 
and 
Services 
 
(A) 
Goods 
and 
Nonmilitary
Services 
 
(B) 
Goods 
from 
Agriculture 
 
(C) 
  
  
 
 
  
Russian Empire excl. Finland and Poland 
    
1913 123.0 121.4 54.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1914 118.3 115.6 49.3 96.2 95.2 90.5 
1915 122.0 115.0 50.0 99.2 94.7 91.8 
1916 112.9 102.9 43.2 91.8 84.8 79.3 
1917 99.3 90.5 42.6 80.7 74.5 78.2 
Russian Empire territory (excl. Finland and Poland) under government control 
1913 123.0 121.4 54.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1914 118.3 115.6 49.3 96.2 95.2 90.5 
1915 122.1 114.8 48.5 99.3 94.6 89.1 
1916 116.8 106.0 42.9 94.9 87.3 78.8 
1917 102.1 92.6 42.2 83.0 76.3 77.5 
Soviet interwar territory 
     
1913 122.0 120.4 54.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1914 116.5 113.9 48.7 95.5 94.6 90.0 
1915 119.9 113.0 49.4 98.3 93.9 91.3 
1916 106.6 97.0 40.1 87.4 80.6 74.2 
1917 93.6 85.4 40.5 76.8 70.9 74.9 
1918 57.3 56.9 31.1 47.0 47.2 57.4 
1919 49.4 46.8 27.3 40.5 38.9 50.5 
1920 49.6 44.4 26.3 40.7 36.9 48.6 
1921 45.4 41.5 23.7 37.2 34.5 43.8 
1922 52.7 50.7 28.5 43.2 42.1 52.7 
1922/23 60.7 59.9 32.7 49.8 49.7 60.5 
1923/24 76.9 76.2 41.8 63.1 63.3 77.3 
1924/25 96.1 95.4 50.3 78.8 79.3 93.0 
1925/26 107.9 107.3 52.0 88.5 89.1 96.1 
1926/27 112.4 111.7 51.9 92.1 92.8 96.0 
1927/28 118.2 117.5 53.0 96.9 97.7 98.0 
Sources: Population: For calendar years, the July 1 figure given in Table 2 and for economic 
years the April 1 figure. National income: Table 5. Income per head: national income, divided 
by population. 
 
 Great War, Civil War, and Recovery 685 
  
  
 
FIGURE 3  
REAL NATIONAL INCOME AND CONSUMPTION PER HEAD, 1913 TO 1927/28: 
SOVIET TERRITORY AND VARIOUS MEASURES IN RUBLES AND 1913 PRICES 
 
Source: See Table 6. 
  
the spirit of Robert Higgs, it should exclude defense from national 
income as an intermediate rather than final use of resources. We can 
subtract the labor services provided to defense; ideally, we would also 
take away the value of capital services and material consumption in the 
defense budget, but there are no measures on which we could base such 
a series. So the data we have give only an upper bound on the desired 
measure of civilian welfare. As the figure makes clear, resources for 
civilian use fell more rapidly than total output during the Great War, 
and again during the Civil War. The real burden of the Imperial Army 
reached around 9 percent of national income at its peak in 1916 and 
1917. Although the Red Army never achieved the absolute numbers 
of the Imperial Army, overall resources were so shrunken that the 
proportional burden it represented rose to more than 10 percent in 
1920.
 Finally, “Goods from agriculture” aims to capture the trend in food 
availability per head. Throughout the period, there was less real 
volatility in agriculture than other sectors. The figure shows that 
agriculture did not benefit from early mobilization for the Great War, 
and subsequently did not collapse to the extent of industry and 
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transport. The figure does not reflect the elimination of the prewar 
export of grains (about one-tenth of the 1913 harvest), which then 
became available for home consumption. Despite these considerations,
a 50-percent-plus reduction in food availability per head had disastrous 
consequences. The decline in availability was highly uneven. There was 
urban, then regional famine. The February 1917 Revolution, which 
ended the monarchy, was sparked by urban food shortages. In October 
1917 the Bolsheviks inherited a public and private distribution system 
in collapse.19 Despite falling harvests, procurement brigades stripped 
the grain producing regions of food.20 Those who stayed in the towns 
were forced into a “crisis mode of consumption.”21 In Petrograd in the 
spring of 1919, an average worker’s daily calorie intake was below 1,600, 
less than half the level of four years later.22 By the end of the war, money 
wages were apparently 4 percent of their prewar level in real terms, with 
workers surviving on public and private inventories and barter.23 
 Although average incomes were not fully restored in 1927/28, the 
composition of national income by sector of origin was almost the same 
as it had been 1913. This is found by comparing the first and last rows 
of Table 5. One small but significant difference was the halved share 
of military activities. This peace dividend for the civilian economy and 
consumption caused military and political leaders intense anxiety given 
Soviet Russia’s state of military encirclement, real and imagined, in the 
late 1920s.24 This concern became an important stimulus to Stalin’s 
Great Leap Forward.  
 The year-on-year pattern of change in real national income per 
head is revealing in various ways. As Figure 1 suggests, our results give 
Russia fuller credit for the military mobilization of 1914 through 1916 
than previous estimates, and revise the pessimistic view of Russia’s 
Great War that is well established in the literature.25 The economy held 
up through 1915, which was blessed by a good grain harvest. By 1916 it 
was in decline, but was still less than 10 percent below the peacetime 
benchmark of 1913. We will show that this was not out of line with the 
wartime performance of much richer European economies. 
 By the same token, the economic decline through the Revolution and 
Civil War appears sharper than in previous accounts. Comparing 1917 
 
 
19 Carr, Bolshevik Revolution. 
20 Malle, Economic Organization; and Figes, Peasant Russia. 
21 Hessler, Social History, pp. 38–48. 
22 Wheatcroft, “Soviet Statistics,” p. 529. 
23 Il’iukhov, Kak platili bol’sheviki, p. 24. 
24 Simonov, “Strengthen the Defence”; and Sokolov, “Before Stalinism.” 
25 Sidorov, Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie; and Gatrell, “Poor Russia.” 
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FIGURE 4  
REAL NATIONAL INCOME PER HEAD, 1913 TO 1927/28: YEAR-ON-YEAR PERCENT 
CHANGE ON SOVIET TERRITORY AND AT 1913 PRICES 
 
Source: Calculated from Table 6, column A. 
 
with 1913, output per head fell by one-fifth in four years. Over the two 
years that followed, from 1917 to 1919, output per head halved. Figure 
4 charts the year-on-year decline on Soviet territory. Notably, output 
fell most precipitously before 1919, when the Red and White armies 
clashed most fiercely. The decline was concentrated in the sectors 
subject to nationalization; half of the decline in large-scale industry 
over the entire period took place in 1918 alone. This suggests strongly 
that the confrontational policies of “war communism,” with widespread 
state confiscation of property and rule by decree, caused greater 
disruption than the fighting. Moreover, as the fighting died away, 
the economy stabilized at around 40 percent of prewar output but did 
not at first recover. By 1920 with a command economy in place, 
the Bolsheviks were able to return large-scale state industry to a path 
of modest growth. But agriculture continued to struggle, because the 
policy of surplus confiscation under war communism gave peasants 
no reason to produce food above subsistence.26 A deadly game ensued 
between the farmers and the authorities over the true level of food 
reserves in the countryside. This game ended in the catastrophic famine 
of 1921. 
 
26 Lih, Bread; and Litoshenko, Sotsializatsiia. 
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 A notable feature of our results is that the famine of 1921 did not 
come out of the blue; it followed a run of disastrous harvests. Cormac Ó 
Gráda has shown that famine is much more likely after two consecutive 
harvest failures, when the countryside has exhausted its reserves.27 As 
Table 5 and Figure 3 reveal, 1921 was the third and worst year in 
a series of catastrophic grain harvests. The factors underlying poor 
harvests have not been disentangled, but combined wartime disruptions 
with confiscatory disincentives to plant and adverse weather conditions 
that lowered yields.28 Consistently with this, new research on the famine 
suggests that it actually began in the summer of 1920, and in some 
regions as early as 1919.29 
 Postwar recovery began only in 1922, following the revolutionary 
government’s decision to restore market relations and the private 
sector in small industry and urban-rural trade. The “New Economic 
Policy” (NEP) was announced in March 1921 under crisis conditions 
of accelerating hyperinflation and famine; recovery was marked only 
in the following year. The main mechanism of recovery was the 
exploitation of spare capacity, which continued until 1929/30.30 Figure 
4 charts the year-on-year growth of Soviet GDP per head up to 1927/28. 
Strong at first, the recovery soon slowed to a single-digit pace. In April 
1929, when the Bolsheviks officially endorsed the “optimal” variant of 
the first Five-Year Plan, average incomes were still below the prewar 
level. In fact, Soviet GDP per head did not significantly exceed this 
benchmark until 1934. 
 The prewar benchmark is an intuitive focal point for comparison, 
but is it the right one? Inspired by Ferenc Jánossy, the comparative 
literature on trend growth, war, and postwar catch-up suggests that 
productive potential does not stand still when war breaks out.31 From this 
point of view, the prewar benchmark is an excessively low bar. By 1928 
fifteen years had passed since the outbreak of the Great War. If in the 
intervening period Russia’s potential GDP per head had risen along its 
modest pre-1913 log-linear trend of 1.74 percent per year, then at the end 
of the 1920s the actual still fell short of the potential by about one- 
quarter.  
 While the period under scrutiny is short, our figures do not support the 
view that NEP provided effective institutions and policies for long- term 
 
27 Ó Gráda, “Making Famine,” pp. 7–9. 
28 Wheatcroft, “Agriculture,” specifically addresses the role of year-on-year weather 
fluctuations in the main agricultural surplus regions at this time. 
29 Adamets, Guerre civile. 
30 Davies, “Industry,” p. 345, fn. 15. 
31 Jánossy, End; Gordon and Walton, “Theory”; Crafts and Mills, “Europe’s Golden Age”; 
Crafts and Toniolo, “Postwar Growth”; and Harrison, “Trends.” 
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Soviet economic development. Once widely held, this view has been 
updated recently. Specifically, Robert C. Allen has argued that the 
best development strategy for the Soviet economy in the 1930s would 
have been industrialization with a soft budget constraint on industrial 
producers and without collectivizing agriculture, in other words, under 
the New Economic Policy as it was implemented in the mid-1920s.32 This 
assessment is hard for us to swallow. The evidence is in our figures: from 
1925 onwards, while the investment mobilization intensified, agriculture 
and small industry stagnated. This is the main factor that stalled the 
recovery, with average incomes still short of the prewar level.  
 Specifically, a soft budget constraint lets managers override profit-
maximizing limits on output. Using a simulation model, Allen finds that 
softening the budget constraint on Soviet large-scale industry led to a 
static output gain. But higher static output was not the only consequence 
of the soft budget constraint. Another was the spreading shortages in 
the urban-rural market. Allen accepts that these deterred the peasant 
farmers from participation in the urban-rural market and contributed to 
the demise of NEP. 33 In fact, the soft budget constraint in industry 
and the market relationship with the peasantry were compatible only for 
a brief period. As shortages became widespread, the Bolsheviks faced 
a choice: use the price mechanism to resolve them, or use force.34 The 
NEP came to an end when Stalin tipped the balance in favor of a violent 
outcome. 
 
RUSSIA IN COMPARISON 
 
 In this section, we compare Russia’s economic experience of world 
war, civil war, and recovery with that of other countries. Previous 
research has suggested that national success in wartime mobilization 
varied inversely with the prewar level of economic development, 
controlling for contingent factors such as distance from the war and the 
time to mobilize.35 But this relationship is found on the basis of a 
limited sample, largely by contrasting the richer maritime powers with 
 
 
32 Allen, Farm to Factory, especially pp. 85–86 and 167–171. Such views have a long 
pedigree. A rethinking of the Soviet “model” of economic development in the 1960s and 1970s 
did much to propagate favorable reevaluation of the New Economic Policy; for a survey, see 
Harrison, “Why Did NEP?” 
33 Allen, Farm to Factory, especially pp. 85–86. See also Harrison, “Why Did NEP?” and 
“Peasantry”; and Johnson and Temin, “Macroeconomics.” For related reservations, see also 
Davies, Review. 
34 Harrison, “Prices,” reviews new evidence on the Bolshevik leaders’ thinking as they 
approached this choice.  
35 Broadberry and Harrison, “Economics”; and Eloranta and Harrison, “War.” 
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FIGURE 5 
WARTIME MOBILIZATION: THE GDPS OF SELECTED EURASIAN COUNTRIES IN 
1917, PERCENT OF 1913 
Source: Appendix Table A37. 
poorer continental economies. It is also sensitive to the revision of 
individual data points such as Russia’s. According to previous 
estimates, Russia’s economic performance in the Great War up to 1917 
was far below that of most other continental countries that entered the 
war. On our figures, Russia’s shortfall disappears. 
Figure 5 plots changes in real GDP of ten Eurasian countries from 
1913 to 1917 against their prewar level of economic development, 
represented by GDP per head in 1913, and incorporating revised data for 
Russia. In addition to Russia itself, we observe eight other continental 
powers (Belgium, Germany, France, Austria, Finland, Hungary, Greece,
and Turkey), and one offshore power (the United Kingdom). There is 
a positive slope to the relationship, but this slope relies on two 
observations, the richest country (the United Kingdom, the only offshore 
power) and the third poorest (Greece). If we exclude these two, the 
relationship is flat. The average GDP decline for the continental powers 
was 23 percent, while Russia’s GDP was distinctly above the average, 
falling by only 18 percent.36  
 
36 Based on Gatrell, “Poor Russia,” in contrast, Broadberry and Harrison, “Economics,” give 
a 32 percent decline for Russia’s GDP in 1917 relative to 1913.  
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 Underlying this was a continental Eurasian pattern of wartime 
economic decline. The pattern reflected a common story, based on 
the burden of subsistence agriculture.37 Across the continent from 
Russia through Germany, Austria, Hungary, and the Balkans to the 
Ottoman Empire, military mobilization deprived peasant farmers of 
men and horses, which initiated a production decline. But the supply 
effect was secondary compared with the market disruption caused by the 
mobilization of domestic industry; this squeezed the availability of all 
those things for which peasants were willing to trade their food surpluses. 
Peasants withdrew from the market, cutting flows of food from country to 
town to a trickle. Interventions to ration food at low prices to urban 
consumers generally increased the market disequilibrium that already 
existed. 
 In 1917 Russia descended into revolution, then civil war. This vastly 
magnified the economic disintegration. In principle the causes and 
consequences of civil war in Russia may be compared with those 
elsewhere. Quantitative studies using cross-country data have been 
limited to the period after 1945. They seem intrinsically unlikely to throw 
much light on the causes of civil war in Russia in 1917. Russia shows 
three markers that have had predictive value for the onset of civil war: a 
scattered population, a weakened central government, and several years 
of declining output.38 But these do not seem to be sufficient causes; as 
Alec Nove remarked, “Other powers too suffered from defeats and from 
food shortages.”39 We have seen that the economic decline up to 1917 
was not more severe in Russia than elsewhere. In short, we will probably 
not be able to explain why Russia was the first to descend into revolution 
and civil war without reference to historical factors that were unique to 
that country and period. 
 The consequences of Russia’s civil war were very severe in 
international comparison. In Russia, output fell by more than one-half; 
this is much more than the average effects found for civil wars since 
1945.40 We look to earlier periods to find devastation on a similar scale. 
On the losing Confederate side of the American Civil War of 1861 to 
1865, production fell by half and real wages collapsed to 11 percent of 
their prewar level.41 What happened in the Russian Civil War was similar 
or worse. A clear difference is that it happened to the winners, not the 
losers.  
 
37 Broadberry and Harrison, “Economics.” 
38 Blattmann and Miguel, “Civil War,” pp. 22–24. 
39 Nove, Economic History, p. 30. 
40 Blattmann and Miguel, “Civil War,” pp. 37–39. 
41 Ransom, “Economics.” 
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FIGURE 6  
POSTWAR RECOVERY: THE GDPS OF SELECTED EURASIAN COUNTRIES IN 1928, 
PERCENT OF 1913 
 
Source : Appendix Table A37. 
 
 The economic outcomes of the Russian Civil War also appear to 
have been more severe than those of civil war in Spain from 1936 to 
1939. There, GDP fell by more than one-quarter and consumption by 
more than one-third between 1935 and 1938.42 In addition, there was 
excess mortality of more than half a million up to 1942, or around 2 
percent of Spain’s prewar population.43 
 No production figures are available for China during its Civil War, 
fought intermittently from 1927 to 1949. As in the Russian case, it is 
impossible to disentangle the premature deaths in the Civil War from 
those of the World War, but the total up to 1945 exceeded 35 million.44 
In proportion to China’s prewar population, around 500 million in the 
early 1930s, Russia’s losses were similar or worse.  
 Finally, we turn to recovery. Russia’s recovery from its Great War and 
Civil War is placed in Eurasian context in Figure 6. This figure shows 
two principal moments in the pattern of postwar performance. One group 
of countries is ranged along a downward sloping convergence frontier 
 
 
42 Martín Aceña, “La economía.” 
43 Antonio and Silvestre, “Las consecuencias.” 
44 Tao, “Zhongri zhanzheng,” p. 13. 
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FIGURE 7 
RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION: REAL NATIONAL INCOME PER HEAD, PERCENT 
OF 1913 
 
Source : Appendix Table A39. All figures are indexed to 1913. 
 
from Greece on the left to the United Kingdom on the right. To the left, a 
second group of countries from Yugoslavia to Romania, all relatively 
poor at the outset, and more or less badly performing over the period, 
falls below the frontier.45 The Soviet economy is found in the midst of 
the second group. This confirms our pessimistic evaluation of Soviet 
economic performance under NEP. 
 
THE LONG RUN 
 
 Figure 7 sets our new estimates in the context of established long-run 
real growth series for Russia and the Soviet Union from 1885 to 2006. It  
 
45 This argument can be formalized. We regress the annual average growth rate of GDP per 
head, 1913 to 1928, on the logarithm of GDP per head in 1913, a World War I dummy and a 
Soviet Union dummy, for all 43 countries for which data are available in the Maddison data set 
at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/. We get:  
Rate191328 = 0.07**  0.007**Ln(GDP/head1913)  0.009WW1  0.015***SU; 
N = 43, R2 = 0.17 
Appendix Table A38 provides the data set and results of other specifications. The coefficient 
on the Soviet Union is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, i.e., the annual 
growth rate of average Soviet incomes between 1913 and 1928 was 1.5 percent slower than it 
should have been, conditional on the prewar GDP level and engagement in the war. 
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turns out that the Great War and Civil War induced the deepest crisis 
that Russia experienced in more than a century of modern economic 
growth. 
 Table 7 provides a more detailed comparison with other major 
shocks to Russia in its troubled twentieth century. Taken together, these 
comprise just about every disaster that can befall modern societies, 
including foreign wars, internal wars, famines, and state collapses. In the 
table, we combine income and consumption measures with estimates of 
the accompanying demographic losses. Few of the figures in the table 
will ever command a scholarly consensus in precise terms, but they 
are broadly instructive. We briefly narrate the stories behind them.
 Stalin’s Great Breakthrough refers to the events following the 
adoption of the first Five-Year Plan in April 1929. Consumption was 
repressed; capital was created in industry and labor and food were 
moved out of agriculture. Since productivity in both sectors declined, 
there was at first no gain in total output. The average figure for 
the consumption decline hides wide variation between regions 
and especially within the countryside. The struggle to control food 
distribution stripped the countryside of grains and spread famine 
through the Ukraine, the Volga region, the North Caucasus, and 
Kazakhstan. Famine in the early 1930s contributed 5.5 to 6.5 million 
premature deaths.  
 Only in the mid-1930s did living standards begin to recover, 
peaking in 1937. Allen has argued with some justice that traditional 
index number concepts employed, for example, by Bergson, somewhat 
understated the underlying welfare gain of up to 30 percent by 1937, 
compared with 1928 to 1937.46 However, Allen’s own estimates for 
farm income in 1937 are probably too high; they rely too heavily on 
inferences from production statistics, and make no allowance for market 
disequilibrium.47 And it should not be forgotten that millions of citizens 
who ought to have been alive to enjoy the unexpectedly good harvest of 
1937 had starved to death in the interim. Presumably, their absence 
helped to lift the average consumption of the survivors. 
 It is notable from Figure 7 that Soviet average real incomes reached 
an interwar peak around 1939. Let us compare this peak with an earlier 
one, not 1913 but 1904, the eve of the 1905 Revolution, when incomes 
were already almost at the level of 1913. Over the 35 years from 1904 
to 1939, incomes rose by about 75 percent. But in most intervening 
years, there was no net growth at all. In fact, three-quarters of the net
 
 
46 Allen, Farm to Factory; and Bergson, Real National Income. 
47 Davies, Review; and Ellman, “Soviet Industrialization.” 
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TABLE 7
RUSSIAN AND SOVIET ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC LOSSES IN FOUR CRISES 
 Decline over 
Period 
(%) 
 Premature  
Deaths 
   
 Total 
National
Income 
 
Personal 
Consumption
per Head 
 
Years 
 
Million
 
Percent of 
Initial 
Population 
 
Years 
 
 
 
World War I-Civil War –62 –56 1913–1921 13.0 8.4 1914–1923 
Great Breakthrough 1 –14 1930–1932 6.0 3.8 1932–1934 
Great Terror-World War II –21 –44 1937–1942 28.6 15.1 1937–1947 
Post-Soviet transition –38 –38 1990–1994 0.1–3.8 0.1–2.6 1991–1998 
Sources:  
Economic losses 
1913–1921: Table 6 national income per head at 1913 prices and, for the change in consumption, 
national income per head from agriculture. 
1930–1932: National income per head at 1990 “international” dollars is by Angus Maddison at 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison. Consumption per head is from Allen, Farm to Factory, p. 147. 
1937–1943: Total real GDP, percent of 1937, is given by Harrison, Accounting, p. 93, for 
government-controlled territory only, which was enlarged by annexations in 1939/40 and then 
reduced (by much more) by invasion and occupation in 1941 and 1942. Household consumption 
combines the decline estimated for 1937 to 1940 by Bergson, Real National Income, p. 252, with 
that estimated for 1940 to 1943 by Harrison, Accounting, p. 104, both at 1937 prices. The wartime 
low point for household consumption was most likely 1942, but we have no population figure for 
that year, so we use 1943 instead. 
1990–1994: National income per head at 1990 “international” dollars is by Maddison at 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/. Consumption change is for “average money incomes” deflated by 
consumer prices in Russian Federation, Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik (1995), p. 77. 
Demographic losses 
1914–1923: For sources and methods, see the Appendix and Table A9. 
1932–1934: The mid-point of the 5.5 to 6.5 million range given by Davies and Wheatcroft, 
Years of Hunger, p. 401. 
1937–1947: The official figure for excess war deaths in 1941 to 1945 is now 26.6 million 
(Andreev, Darskii, and Khar'kova, “Otsenka”). Ellman and Maksudov, “Soviet Deaths,” have 
pointed out that this may (or more likely may not) include roughly 2.7 million wartime emigrants. 
To the 26.6 million, we add 950,000 as a lower limit on deaths in the Great Terror of 1937/38 
(Ellman, “Soviet Repression Statistics,” p. 1154), plus one million for the lower limit on deaths 
from famine in 1946/47 (Ellman, “1947 Soviet Famine,” p. 616). 
1990–1998: Our lower limit is the 100,000 violent deaths in regional wars and ethnic conflicts, 
cited by Ellman, “Social Costs.” The upper limit is found by adding 3.7 million excess deaths 
attributed to transitional reforms by UNICEF, Desiat’ let, p. 51. We motivate the upper and lower 
limits further as follows. As is well known, the Russian transition was associated with a significant 
spike in male mortality. In a pessimistic overview, Ellman, “Social Costs,” associates the excess 
mortality and morbidity with transition policies. Stuckler, King, and McKee, “Mass Privatization,” 
specifically attribute the increase in male mortality to mass privatization and the associated actual 
or expected unemployment. A potentially confounding factor is that male life expectancy in the 
Soviet Union was on a steadily downward trend from the 1960s, but this trend was temporarily 
reversed in the mid-1980s by higher alcohol prices and supply restrictions. On this basis, male 
mortality on the eve of transition was abnormally low and could have been expected to rebound 
(Demoscope, “Smertnost’”). Brainerd and Cutler, “Autopsy,” find that the relative cheapening of 
alcohol under transition explains up to a quarter of the increased mortality of the period. Earle, 
“Mass Privatisation,” Earle and Gehlbach, “Did Mass Privatisation?” Gerry, Mickiewicz, and  
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TABLE 7 — continued
Nikoloski, “Did Mass Privatisation?” and Brown, Earle, and Telegdy, “Employment,” have 
challenged the link from transition to mortality in other ways, including the specific channel from 
privatization to mortality via unemployment. For their reply, see Stuckler, King, and McKee, “Did 
Mass Privatisation?” In this crisis, unlike others, Russia received substantial net immigration of 
more than 13 million by the year 2000, including many from the “near abroad” (UN, International 
Migration Report, p. 3). 
 
growth that took place from peak to peak was achieved in just five 
years, from 1933 to 1937. By that year, the Soviet economy had just 
about struggled back to the pre-1913 trend.48 This suggests that all 
Stalin had brought about by World War II was recovery from the 1905 
Revolution, World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Civil War, and 
his own policy of collectivization.  
 The central event of the decade from 1937 to 1947 was World War II. 
Linked to it are preparations for war in the preceding years and a food 
crisis that followed the end of the war. Under war preparations, we 
include both large-scale rearmament against the foreign enemy and the 
Great Terror of 1937/38, in which Stalin waged preemptive war against 
his “potential enemies” at home.49 The world war itself added more than 
26 million excess deaths in combat, and from disease, famine, and 
repression on both sides of the front line. With the German invasion, 
Soviet-controlled territory shrank, but Stalin’s policies successfully 
managed the war economy. The loss of agricultural land and the intense 
mobilization of resources into defense put living standards into a 
deadly squeeze, however. Coming on top of a prewar decline induced 
by rearmament pressures, consumption per head fell by up to one-half. 
At the end of the war, a regional food crisis struck the Ukraine, 
southwestern Russia, and Soviet Moldavia and carried off more lives.  
 Finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to economic and 
demographic upheaval for post-Soviet Russia. The transition from 
socialism is the only crisis in which mass violence did not take the lead. 
In fact, it was associated with economic losses on the scale of a major 
war, but with only minor wars taking place. Official figures suggest that 
up to 1998 average incomes and consumption fell by around two fifths. 
Such figures overstate the decline in welfare, however, because they 
neglect the contemporaneous gain to consumers as the retail market 
evolved from severe shortage to equilibrium; this gain may have been 
substantial.50 
 
48 For the pre-1913 trend, see the Appendix, Table A-39. 
49 Khlevnyuk, “Objectives.” 
50 Collier, “Welfare Standard.” 
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 While economic aspects are debated, assessments of the demographic 
costs of transition are extremely polarized. In Table 7, we give upper and 
lower limits. Our lower limit is set by the 100,000 deaths arising from 
small-scale ethnic clashes and regional conflicts. Our upper limit includes 
the mortality spike of the early 1990s, largely consisting of deaths among 
men of working age across Russia from alcoholic-related causes including 
violence and diseases. The causes of this increased mortality are bitterly 
disputed, as discussed in a note to the table. Some attribute the additional 
deaths to transition processes and policies. Others see the mortality bulge 
as unrelated to transition; it had been stored up by pre-transition trends 
and policies and would have happened anyway. These views of 
transitional mortality are uncompromisingly opposed to each other, and 
cannot be averaged. 
 Table 7 confirms that the Great War and Civil War rank first among 
Russia’s economic disasters of the last century. National income per head 
fell by more than three-fifths from 1913 to 1921. We approximate the 
consumption loss from agricultural production per head, which fell by 
more than one-half. The overall burden of excess deaths was around 9 
percent of the prewar population. Normalized by the prewar population, 
the demographic burden fell not far short of that of World War II. Hunger-
related causes were the most important factor in excess mortality, 
followed by fighting and terror in the Civil War. 
 A wider lesson from Table 7 may be the importance of the state in the 
history of modern Russia. In the Great Breakthrough and World War II, 
the state remained intact. Production was maintained in the midst of 
disasters that killed millions of people. In particular, the state retained its 
ability to transfer food from people of secondary status such as peasants 
and forced laborers, who then died, to soldiers and industrial workers, 
who then lived. In contrast, the state failures of 1917 and 1991 were 
associated with huge losses of output as well as of consumption 
and lives. In each case, the scale of deaths depended heavily on the 
presence of open violence; this is exemplified by the comparison of two 
transitions. 
 Russia’s political establishment believes that today’s answer for Russia 
is to shore up the “power vertical” of the state at all costs.51 In this view, 
no outcome is worse than a failed state. Russia’s twentieth century shows 
that a failed state could be associated with terrible misery, but it also 
associates grim suffering with a state powerful enough to starve and kill 
without restraint. Whether the answer for Russia is confined to state 
consolidation, or includes building an economy that is more deeply 
 
51 Putin, “State.” 
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rooted in civil society and private enterprise and more resilient in the face 
of political action, is another story. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Our work fills the last remaining gap in the record of Russian  
and Soviet national income in the twentieth century. This gap, starting  
in 1914 and finishing in 1928, is full of historic and traumatic events: 
Russia’s Great War, the Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War, and 
postwar reconstruction under the New Economic Policy, which set the 
stage for Stalin’s Great Breakthrough to forced industrialization. 
 In comparison with previous interpretations, our findings give a more 
favorable picture of Russia’s economic mobilization for the Great War. 
Correspondingly, we show the economic catastrophe of the Civil War in 
a harsher light. Our results confirm that by 1928 economic recovery, 
measured by national income per head, was most likely still incomplete. 
We draw negative inferences concerning both the quality of Soviet 
economic institutions and policies in the 1920s and the economic 
achievements of the 1930s. 
 Wars and revolutions have the capacity to wreak havoc on modern 
societies. Nesting one inside the other, Russia’s Great War and Civil War 
led to economic disaster and demographic tragedy. The scale of losses 
can be measured against both Russian and global standards. In Russian 
terms, it was the worst economic disaster of the twentieth century. Only 
World War II resulted in a greater loss of Russian lives. International 
comparisons also rank the Russian experience of warfare between 1914 
and 1921 highly in the damage done to life and living standards. 
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